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Intro
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Transient execution attacks risk leaking information Linux maintains security using software mitigations
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Software mitigations are expensive
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Goal: faster mitigations
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Transient execution attack example
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Typical mitigation approach
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Ward has a different approach
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Our observation: Unmapped Speculation Contract (USC)
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USC is a good hardware-software contract
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Split kernel to leverage USC
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Syscalls start executing in the Q-domain
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World switches use two stacks
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Redesigning the kernel to avoid switches
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Allocating memory without world switches
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Implementation
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Ward does better on LEBench
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Related Work: Spectrum of defenses
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Open question: what is the best way to mitigate attacks?
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Conclusion
Description:
Explore a 20-minute conference talk from OSDI '20 that presents Ward, a novel kernel design addressing the performance penalties associated with mitigating transient execution side-channel attacks like Meltdown and Spectre. Learn about the unmapped speculation contract and how it enables many system calls to execute without mitigation overhead. Discover how Ward's separate kernel page table for each process improves performance compared to standard designs with mitigations, ranging from a few percent to several factors depending on the hardware generation and system call. Gain insights into the implementation in the sv6 research kernel, related defense strategies, and open questions in the field of transient execution attack mitigation.

Efficiently Mitigating Transient Execution Attacks Using the Unmapped Speculation Contract

USENIX
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