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1
Intro
2
Communication and Opinion Formation
3
Generalization VS Communication
4
Learning and Persuading with Anecdotes
5
Journalism Example
6
Impact of Strategic Communication
7
Model - Observations
8
Model - Sender
9
Model - Receiver
10
Model - Rational Behavior
11
Communication Schemes
12
Understanding Sender's Choices
13
Temptation to Persuade
14
Equilibrium Characterization
15
Bias and Extreme Signals in Equilibria
16
Implications on the Receiver
17
Homophily due to Rational Strategic Behavior
18
Equilibria and Reputation
19
Strategic Communication in Economics
20
Machine Learning and Strategic Behavior
Description:
Explore a 28-minute conference talk on learning and persuasion through anecdotal evidence, presented by Nika Haghtalab at IPAM's Mathematics of Collective Intelligence Workshop. Delve into a model of communication between two agents using hard anecdotal evidence, examining rational behaviors in equilibrium and the temptation for senders to provide biased information. Gain insights into human communication, polarization, and biased beliefs. Investigate topics such as generalization vs. communication, strategic behavior in journalism, equilibrium characterization, and the implications for receivers. Discover how homophily can arise from rational strategic behavior and explore the connections between strategic communication in economics and machine learning.

Learning and Persuading with Anecdotes - IPAM at UCLA

Institute for Pure & Applied Mathematics (IPAM)
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