Does Isomorphism Sufficiency Entail Eliminativism/Illusionism
Description:
Explore a category-theoretic framework for phenomenal holism in this conference talk. Delve into the proposition that experiences are defined by their relationships to other potential experiences, drawing parallels with the Yoneda lemma in category theory. Examine preliminary empirical support for this framework in characterizing phenomenology, focusing on color experiences across the visual field. Address theoretical concerns surrounding 'inverted qualia' thought experiments and the potential unbinding of experiences from their substrate. Investigate possible solutions to these issues without resorting to eliminativism. Gain insights into the development of this framework and its implications for verifying the neurophenomenal structuralism hypothesis, which posits a structural resemblance between neural correlates of consciousness and their phenomenological counterparts.
Towards a Category-Theoretic Framework for Phenomenal Holism