Impacts of Different Contracts and Policy Constraints in a Distributional Robust Approach
Description:
Explore a seminar on dynamic games and applications that delves into decentralized supply channels and multi-periodic bilevel equilibrium problems. Learn about a Stackelberg game model featuring a manufacturer and retailer managing dynamic, price-dependent demand over multiple periods. Discover how a distributional-robust approach addresses incomplete demand information, providing a lower bound on expected profits. Compare periodic and single contracts, examining their impacts on leader and follower payoffs. Investigate the incorporation of pollution capacity constraints, pollution tax, and cap-and-trade systems into the optimal algorithm. Evaluate the influence of buyback contracts in optimally sharing leftover risk. Gain insights from this 35-minute presentation by Mahnaz Fakhrabadi from the Norwegian School of Economics, delivered at the GERAD Research Center.
Impacts of Different Contracts and Policy Constraints in a Distributional Robust Approach